

Message Text

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SUBJ: REPORT ON SOVIET WORKING GROUP TO ASSESS US TACTICS
ON CSCE AND SALT

1. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT OF ONE-PAGE "REPORT" ON ALLEGED FINDINGS OF SOVIET SPECIALIST WORKING GROUP (APPARENTLY COMPOSED OF ACADEMICS AND INSTITUTE EXPERTS) WHICH WAS SUPPOSEDLY CONVENED AT REQUEST OF USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO ANALYZE PROBABLE US GOVERNMENT "TACTICS" ON CSCE, SALT, OTHER MAJOR ISSUES IN WAKE OF TRADE BILL DEMISE AND WHICH WAS HANDED TO EMBASSY OFFICER BY SOVIET CONTACT.

2. QTE: AT THE REQUEST OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR A GROUP OF ACADEMIC SPECIALISTS IN THE AREA OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HAS PREPARED A REPORT ANALYZING THE TACTICS OF THE ORGANS OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF THE USA WHICH TORPEDOED THE GRANTING OF MFN TO THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS REPORT, WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, IT IS NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE EXISTED DIFFERENCES ON THIS ISSUE BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS, THEY APPARENTLY DID IN FACT ADHERE TO THE SAME VIEWPOINT IN AGREEING THAT A TACTIC OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE USSR WOULD BRING RESULTS.

3. IN THE REPORT IT IS STATED THAT WASHINGTON'S MISTAKE IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE WILL NOT NECESSARILY TEACH IT TO AVOID

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SIMILAR MISTAKES IN THE FUTURE. THEREFORE, THE EXPERTS DO NOT

EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH A SCENARIO MAY ALSO BE PERFORMED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE IN REGARD TO THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT ON SALT. IN THIS CONNECTION THEY PROPOSE THAT THE ACTUAL POSITION OF THE USA ON THIS ISSUE BE JUDGED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE BASIS OF PROGRESS IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE PERIOD FEBRUARY-APRIL OF THIS YEAR.

4. MOREOVER, THE SOVIET UNION COUNTS ON THE CLEAR FULFILLMENT BY THE AMERICAN SIDE OF THE ASSURANCES IT HAS GIVEN TO CONSIDER FAVORABLY THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW ON THE PROBLEM OF THE STABILITY OF FRONTIERS IN EUROPE. AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET CIRCLES HAVE VIEWED WITH ANXIETY THE ATTEMPTS OF THE FRG TO INCLUDE IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENTS OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE (CSCE) A RESERVATION ON "THE PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS." IN THIS WORDING AND IN THIS CONTEXT, THAT WOULD MEAN, IN ESSENCE, A RECOGNITION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF REVISING THE FRONTIERS ESTABLISHED AS A RESULT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. END QUOTE.

5. THIS REPORT WAS GIVEN TO EMBASSY OFFICER (FIRST SECRETARY IN ECONOMIC SECTION) ON MARCH 13 BY ANATOLIY SOKOLOV, A SENIOR ECONOMIST IN THE INSTITUTE FOR WORLD SOCIALIST ECONOMY IN MOSCOW, DURING A DINNER MEETING TO DISCUSS CURRENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS. BACKGROUND OF EMBASSY OFFICER'S CONTACT WITH SOKOLOV AND EMBASSY EVALUATION FOLLOW.

6. INSTITUTE OF WORLD SOCIALIST ECONOMY, HEADED BY DOCTOR OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES O.T. BOGOMOLOV, SPECIALIZES ON PROBLEMS OF CEMA INTEGRATION AND SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. IT OCCUPIES POSITION ROUGHLY SIMILAR TO INSTITUTE FOR WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO) HEADED BY N.K. INOZEMTSEV. BOTH ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE CONSULTANT, "THINK TANK" RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND WITH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SOKOLOV IS CURRENTLY WORKING ON INTEGRATION OF 1976-80 INTERNAL ECONOMIC PLANS OF CEMA COUNTRIES, AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN CEMA LONG-RANGE COMPLEX PROGRAM WHICH HAS HIGH PRIORITY IN MOSCOW'S OBJECTIVES FOR CEMA. HE WORKS FOR ACADEMICIAN UY. SHIRAYEV WHO RECENTLY PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ON EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC TRENDS IN IMEMO'S JOURNAL WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND IS COLLABORATING WITH SHIRAYEV ON A BOOK. SOKOLOV ALSO LECTURES AT THE UNIVERSITY

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OF MOSCOW AND OCCASIONALLY AT THE MFA DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY.

7. EMBASSY OFFICER FIRST MET SOKOLOV IN BELGRADE IN 1972 WHERE SOKOLOV WAS ASSIGNED AS FIRST SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY THERE. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE INSTITUTE HAS AN OFFICER AT EACH OF THE SOVIET EMBASSIES IN CEMA COUNTRIES.) SOKOLOV RETURNED TO MOSCOW IN THE FALL OF 1973. IN THE COURSE OF AS MANY AS 20 MEETINGS WITH HIM IN BELGRADE AND IN MOSCOW

THE EMBASSY OFFICER HAS FOUND HIM AN INTERESTING AND AT TIMES VALUABLE CONTACT FOR HIS INFORMED COMMENT ON THE SPECIALIZED WORLD OF CEMA, EAST EUROPEAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND EAST-WEST TRADE. CONVERSATIONS HAVE CENTERED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON ECONOMIC MATTERS, ALTHOUGH DURING THE PAST YEAR SOKOLOV HAS OCCASIONALLY MENTIONED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PARTICULARLY THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE USSR ATTACHES TO THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE. ON TWO OR THREE OCCASIONS DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS SOKOLOV HAS MENTIONED HIS PARTICIPATION IN SPECIAL WORKING GROUPS ORGANIZED IN CONNECTION WITH HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AT THE REQUEST OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. ON WAS IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE US ACTION ON THE TRADE BILL AND ANOTHER PRIOR TO VLADIVOSTOK.

8. WE ASSUME, OF COURSE, THAT SOKOLOV IS CONTROLLED, AND THAT HE IS ALLOWED TO MAINTAIN HIS REGULAR CONTACTS WITH EMBASSY OFFICER FOR PURPOSE OF DISCUSSION OF SPECIALIZED ECONOMIC SUBJECTS, FOR POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION--OR DIS- INFORMATION--AND FOR POSSIBLE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY. UP TO NOW SOKOLOV HAS AT NO TIME DURING HIS NEARLY THREE YEARS OF INTERMITTENT CONTACT WITH EMBASSY OFFICER ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR MADE OTHER OVERTURES IN DIRECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY. (THIS IS NOT TO RULE OUT POSSIBILITY THAT HE MAY DO SO AT ANY TIME, NOR IS IT TO BE RULED OUT THAT HE IS FULL-TIME KGB OPERATIVE DESPITE HIS SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE AND APPARENT PROFESSIONAL POSITION).

9. ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE BACKGROUND, WE ARE UNABLE TO JUDGE THE RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION TRANSMITTED IN PARA 2. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT SEEM, IN OUR VIEW, TO REPRESENT PLAUSIBLE SOVIET VIEW. THE SOVIET POSITION ON PEACEFUL CHANGE WAS, AT LEAST BY THE TIME THIS REPORT WAS HANDED OVER, NOT THAT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM OURS. THE REPORT'S CONCLUSION ON THE

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VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT IS SOMEWHAT MORE BELIEVABLE, THOUGH ONLY WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS. THE CONCERN THAT IT DESCRIBES ON THIS ISSUE PROBABLY DOES EXIST TO SOME DEGREE IN SOME CIRCLES. WE HAVE NO INDICATION, HOWEVER, THAT THIS CONCERN HAS ACQUIRED SUCH SCOPE AS TO BECOME GOVERNING IN THE SOVIET VIEW OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE US. THE CONTINUED PRESS FOR AGREEMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, AS FORCEFULLY STATED IN BREZHNEV'S SPEECH IN BUDAPEST ON MARCH 18 AND ECHOED IN KOSYGIN'S SPEECH IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 20, INDICATES AN ASSUMPTION BY THE SOVIETS THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO HONOR AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO IN THIS AREA.

10. WE ARE THEREFORE PUZZLED WITH REGARD TO THIS MATTER, CAN RECALL NO PRECEDENT FOR SOVIETS TO HAND OVER ASSESSMENT OF THIS KIND, AND WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENT BY WASHINGTON ADDRESSEES.

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